The Causes of War illuminates one of the central questions of international relations through an historical analysis of the origins of war and peace. Unlike previous authors who take as given some set of power and preferences that drive a nation to war, Blainey focuses on perception within the dyad of two states in the midst of “rivalry and tension.”
Like poker players in a high stakes game, how do these states assess not only their own hand, but also guess at that of their opponent? This is his main point: “Wars usually begin when two nations disagree on their relative strength, and wars usually cease when the fighting nations agree on their relative strength.” (p. 293)
The explanation of imbalance of power as a contributing factor to war is not new – in The History of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians point out their clear military superiority to the Melians as they lay out their case– but the relative perception, and its potential for inaccuracy, is an important contribution. So, too, is the commitment problem illustrated by the Melian Dialogue. By Blainey’s account, had the Athenians (even erroneously) believed their chances of winning to be slim, peace, not war, may have been the result.
In his discussion on the causes of peace, Blainey finds that a decisive war victory is the only clear answer, debunking popular 19th century notions of mutual international understanding, and reinforcing realist traditions. To this end, Blainey notes that the causes of war and peace are the same.
What, therefore, are the roots of misperception between states facing the possibility of war? Assigning the decision-making process to the state leader, Blainey focuses on seven factors related to assessments of internal strength (military power, public discord, nationalism, economic strength), external factors (world and ally reactions), and personal factors (unrealistic exuberance before war as with WWI, personal characteristics.) Any of these is subject to miscalculation, and when leaders attempt to calculate these factors for potential opponents, misperception is more likely.
Since opponents are unwilling to share private information before war, it can only be revealed through the process of fighting. In the end, accurate perception of relative strength provides the basis for peace.
Like poker players in a high stakes game, how do these states assess not only their own hand, but also guess at that of their opponent? This is his main point: “Wars usually begin when two nations disagree on their relative strength, and wars usually cease when the fighting nations agree on their relative strength.” (p. 293)
The explanation of imbalance of power as a contributing factor to war is not new – in The History of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians point out their clear military superiority to the Melians as they lay out their case– but the relative perception, and its potential for inaccuracy, is an important contribution. So, too, is the commitment problem illustrated by the Melian Dialogue. By Blainey’s account, had the Athenians (even erroneously) believed their chances of winning to be slim, peace, not war, may have been the result.
In his discussion on the causes of peace, Blainey finds that a decisive war victory is the only clear answer, debunking popular 19th century notions of mutual international understanding, and reinforcing realist traditions. To this end, Blainey notes that the causes of war and peace are the same.
What, therefore, are the roots of misperception between states facing the possibility of war? Assigning the decision-making process to the state leader, Blainey focuses on seven factors related to assessments of internal strength (military power, public discord, nationalism, economic strength), external factors (world and ally reactions), and personal factors (unrealistic exuberance before war as with WWI, personal characteristics.) Any of these is subject to miscalculation, and when leaders attempt to calculate these factors for potential opponents, misperception is more likely.
Since opponents are unwilling to share private information before war, it can only be revealed through the process of fighting. In the end, accurate perception of relative strength provides the basis for peace.
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